Regional convergence and economic development in the EU : the relation between national growth and regional disparities within the old and the new member states by Kramar, Hans
Int. J Latest Trends Fin. Eco. Sc.                   Vol-6 No. 1 March, 2016 
 
1052 
Regional convergence and economic 
development in the EU: the relation between 
national growth and regional disparities               
within the old and the new member states 
Hans Kramar 
Vienna University of Technology: Department of Spatial Planning 
Karlsplatz 13 / 1040 Vienna / Austria 
hans.kramar@tuwien.ac.at 
 
Abstract - While European integration has substantially 
contributed to economic convergence on a national 
scale, the diverging development of highly developed 
metropolitan regions and lagging rural areas has 
become a growing challenge especially for the new 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Although it is widely assumed that economically 
growing countries are usually confronted with rising 
inequalities, the question, whether there is a direct 
relation between total economic growth and regional 
divergence, has not been sufficiently answered so far. In 
this context the paper inquires to which degree the 
process of economic restructuring and catching-up in 
European countries is accompanied by increasing 
spatial disparities. The empirical investigation of recent 
GDP data confirms the trend towards economic 
convergence on a national scale. On a regional scale, 
however, the process of convergence was much slower 
and almost came to an end after the beginning of the 
global economic crisis in 2008. The reason for these 
diverging results can be found in the change of 
disparities within the countries: While regional 
inequalities largely remained unchanged in the majority 
of the old member states, the gap between rich and poor 
regions widened in most countries which accessed the 
EU since 2004. This trend slowed down or even reversed 
after 2008, which seems to confirm the assumption that 
economic growth intensifies spatial divergence. A 
detailed analysis of the correlation between national 
growth rates and the change of regional disparities, 
however, indicates that growing divergence in the new 
member states can hardly be explained by the speed of 
total economic growth, but rather by other specific 
conditions there. A reflection on the mechanisms of 
agglomeration economies suggests three arguments for 
the strong diverging effect of the catching-up processes 
in the new member states, which await to be tested 
empirically in future research. 
Keywords - economic growth, regional disparities, 
convergence, agglomeration economies 
1. Introduction: Economic growth 
and regional convergence in 
literature 
In regional science and economic geography the 
debate on the change of regional disparities and on 
the process of spatial convergence has always moved 
between two poles: Under the neoclassical paradigm 
the free play of market forces guarantees the 
compensation of inequalities in space as a 
consequence of mobile labor and capital (Richardson 
1973) or trade of specialized goods (Ohlin 1933). On 
the contrary, the approach of regional polarization, 
which basically goes back to Myrdal’s concept of 
circular cumulative causation (1957), argues that 
spatial inequalities tend to increase in recursive and 
self-reinforcing processes. While Myrdal claims that 
the outflow of labor, capital and resources from the 
less developed regions (“backwash effects”) 
outperform the positive “spread effects” of economic 
development in growing regions, Hirschman’s model 
of “unbalanced growth” (1958) argues that negative 
“polarization effects” produce a temporary increase 
of inequalities, which tends to be compensated by 
“trickling-down-effects” and “counter-balancing 
forces” (e.g. political intervention) in the long run. 
Schmidt (1966) substantially contributes to a spatially 
differentiated theory of economic growth analyzing 
the diffusion of investment effects in space. He 
argues that the localization of complementary 
investment effects on other sectors depends on the 
stage of development of a country claiming that 
complementary effects in less developed countries 
tend to be strongly concentrated on the location of 
investment. Similar to Hirschman, however, Schmidt 
also expects economic and political counterforces to 
compensate the short-term agglomerative impact of 
investment.  
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The phenomenon of polarized growth was 
largely neglected in neoclassical theory until the 
“New Economic Geography” implemented 
agglomeration economies into the neoclassical model 
(Krugman 1991, Venables 1996, Puga 1999). This 
approach is widely considered as an important step 
away from the equilibrium principle in economics 
allowing the explanation of spatial inequalities and 
unbalanced growth. In Economic Geography and 
Regional Science, however, the investigation of 
agglomeration economies has a long tradition, which 
goes back to the basic works of Weber (1909), 
Marshall (1920), Hoover (1937) or Isard (1956). 
Since then, a lot of theoretical and empirical work has 
been done to explore the driving forces of economic 
concentration in space. In this context the term 
“agglomeration economies” is not confined to 
pecuniary externalities (which, for instance, appear in 
reduced transport and trade costs for firms), but 
covers all kinds of advantages and disadvantages, 
which result from the spatial concentration of 
economic activities. Authors, who explore the 
mechanisms of “innovative milieus”, stress the 
importance of human relations and informal networks 
in a limited geographical area (Camagni 1991, 
Aydalot and Keeble 1988, Maillat 1995) as the main 
reason for innovative firms to locate close to related 
companies. Research on “industrial districts” strongly 
emphasizes the importance of “collective 
efficiencies” (Schmitz 1995) in localized industrial 
clusters (Becanttini 1990, Priore and Sabel 1989, 
Markusen 1996, Harrison 1992), mainly picking up 
the concept of Marshallian externalities, which 
regards knowledge-spillovers, labor market pooling 
und input sharing as the main agglomeration factors 
of industries. Porter (1990) emphasizes the 
importance of local competition, which tends to 
promote knowledge externalities and therefore 
accelerates the pursuit and adoption of innovation. 
Other authors attribute the agglomeration of 
innovation and growth mainly to localized knowledge 
spillovers in industrial clusters (Jaffe 1989, Feldman 
1994, Feldman and Florida 1994). Most of these 
approaches agree on the fact that the spatial 
concentration of economic activities is a necessary, 
but not a sufficient condition for the emergence of 
agglomeration economies. Consequently, there is an 
extensive debate in literature on the specific local 
conditions, which foster or impede agglomeration 
economies in different spatial contexts (Breschi and 
Lissoni 2001, Fritsch 2003) with a strong focus on 
the role of firm networks, co-operations and 
institutional frameworks (Camagni 1994, Cappelin 
2003, Bathelt 2003). In this context terms like 
“embeddedness” (Gravovetter 1985, Oerlemans et al. 
2001) or “untraded interdependencies” (Storper 
1997), which refer to the intensity and quality of 
relations between economic actors (including 
informal conventions, habits and rules as well as 
mutual trust), have been defined as specific local 
assets, which promote the agglomeration of firms. 
The question, whether these externalities rather 
appear within a certain branch (commonly referred to 
as “localization economies”) or between different 
branches (“urbanization economies”) is 
controversially discussed in respective literature 
(Glaeser et al. 1992, Audretsch 2003, van der Panne 
2004). Despite the heterogeneity of all these 
approaches, they all argue for the advantages of 
spatial concentration, which are responsible for 
higher returns of public and private investment in 
urban centers than in sparsely populated areas. From 
that point of view the concept of agglomeration 
economies suggests that it is not economic 
development that produces spatial inequalities, but 
rather the other way round: Assuming the existence 
of positive agglomeration economies, it is the spatial 
concentration of economic activity which determines 
economic growth.      
In the broad scientific debate on the mechanisms 
behind regional convergence or divergence the 
influence of national economic growth only plays a 
minor role. Nevertheless, it was already in the 
1950ies, when Kuznets (1955) postulated that 
economic development comes along with a 
temporary increase of social and spatial inequalities. 
The Kuznets curve, which says that growing income 
first induces rising and then falling disparities, is 
based on the assumption that industrialization induces 
a temporary migration from the rural areas to the 
cities due to higher wages. In a comprehensive 
empirical study, which demonstrates that spatial 
inequalities are higher and increase faster in less 
developed countries over a long period of time, 
Williamson (1965) comes to rather similar 
conclusions: “[…] experience suggests that 
increasing regional inequality is generated during the 
early development stages, while mature growth has 
produced regional convergence or a reduction in 
differentials” (p.44). In a more recent study Petrakos 
et al. (2005) indicate that disparities tend to increase 
in growth periods and decrease in times of stagnation 
or recession. Postulating a procyclical behavior of 
economic disparities the authors conclude that “[…] 
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no matter what other factors may affect the evolution 
of disparities, economic growth will always generate 
new imbalances” (p. 1853). Barrios and Strobl (2009) 
attribute the causal relation between economic 
growth and increasing spatial inequalities to the 
tendency of knowledge and innovation to 
agglomerate in space: “[…] although knowledge and 
technical progress are in this regard seen as the main 
engines of economic growth in the long run, the latter 
may inevitably increase rather than decrease regional 
inequalities, and these two elements are very unlikely 
to be evenly spread” (p.575). Since the authors 
assume that technological and structural changes do 
not appear in all regions at the same time, they expect 
rising regional inequalities “at least at the beginning 
of periods of high national growth” (p.582).  
In brief, there is a lot of research on polarized 
growth, which implicitly assumes that economic 
development is commonly connected with growing 
regional disparities. Nevertheless, there is a lack of 
explicit empirical evidence whether the speed of total 
economic growth has a direct impact on the change 
of spatial inequalities. Therefore, the relation between 
national growth and intranational disparities in the 
EU member states is empirically analyzed in section 
3. 
 
2. Regional and national convergence 
in the European Union 
Recent empirical studies on the change of 
disparities within the European Union show that 
interregional convergence within the member states 
clearly lags behind international convergence 
between them, which especially applies to the new 
member states in Central and Eastern Europe 
(Kramar 2006, Brakman and Marrewijk 2013, 
Monasteriotis 2014, European Union 2014). In the 
first part of the empirical work these findings are 
verified and updated for the EU28 between 2000 and 
2011. To get a detailed picture of the change of 
spatial inequalities in the European Union over that 
period, the analysis distinguishes between: 
 2 spatial levels 
- national level (NUTS-0) 
- regional level (NUTS-3) 
 2 groups of countries 
- national level (NUTS-0) 
- regional level (NUTS-3) 
 3 periods of time 
- before the enlargement of the EU (2000 - 2004) 
- before the outbreak of the global economic crisis 
(2004 - 2008) 
- during the crisis (2008 - 2011)    
The economic output is measured by the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) at current market prices in 
Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) per inhabitant as 
provided by Eurostat in April 2015. Economic 
disparities are expressed by the coefficient of 
variation of the single (regional or national) GDP 
levels. Since the coefficient of variation is a 
standardized measure of dispersion, which is defined 
as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of 
all values, the results of samples with different ranges 
can easily be compared. The standard deviation 
provides “absolute” disparities, which reflect the 
differences from the mean value, while the 
coefficient of variation indicates “relative” 
disparities, which are related to the quotients of 
regional and national values. This difference is 
especially important for the comparison of deviations 
between different countries, but also for the 
interpretation of changes over time, which can be 
illustrated by a simple example: If all regional GDP 
per capita values increased by the same growth rate 
(e.g. +5%), the standard deviation would rise, while 
the coefficient of variation would remain unchanged. 
If the GDP per capita grew by a constant amount in 
all regions (e.g. +200€), the standard deviation would 
stay the same, while the coefficient of variation 
would decrease. For the examination of changing 
regional inequalities over time the “relative” view of 
disparities seems to be the appropriate approach, 
since equal growth rates in all regions are commonly 
interpreted as an unchanged spatial distribution. 
The diagram in figure 1 confirms that the 
disparities between the 27 of the 28 current member 
states of the EU (Luxembourg is excluded from the 
analysis due to the special situation of the country, 
which causes extraordinary GDP levels) strongly 
decreased between 2000 and 2011. This development 
can be interpreted as a typical process of Beta-
convergence (see Barro 1991), which is characterized 
by a dynamic development of the poorest countries 
with growth rates clearly above the European 
average: The correlation coefficient between the GDP 
per capita in the year 2000 and the growth rate in the 
period 2000 - 2008 is statistically significant (1% 
level of significance) with a value of -0,714.  
Evidently, this trend, which is not influenced by the 
actual accession of the new member states in 2004 
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and 2007, was harshly stopped in the year 2008 when 
the global economic crisis reached Europe and 
threatened economic development there. Economic 
stagnation in most countries also had an impact on 
the process of convergence, since the catching-up 
process of the less developed countries was 
interrupted. 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Figure 1. Change of economic disparities in the 
EU28 (differentiated for “old” and “new” member 
states) on the national level 2000-2011 
The separate consideration of the development 
in the “old” EU15 und the “new” EU13 shows rather 
different results: The disparities between the old 
member states remain at a rather low level over a 
long period. A relatively rapid rise of the curve since 
2009, however, might indicate that the crisis affects 
the lagging countries in Southern Europe most. 
Differences in national GDP are much higher 
between the new member states, but there is a clear 
trend towards equalization. This result proves that the 
process of national convergence within the EU is 
mainly caused by a fast growth of the most lagging 
countries (e.g. Romania, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Latvia), 
which were able to reduce the gap not only to the 
richest countries in Northern and Western Europe, 
but also to the well performing new member states in 
CEE. The gradient of the function indicates that this 
trend was not seriously affected by the crisis and 
essentially continued over the whole period.  
The diagram in figure 2, which shows the 
change of economic disparities between the European 
NUTS-3-regions over the same period of time, 
indicates that inequalities between the poor and the 
rich regions are higher in the new member states than 
in the whole EU. This picture reflects the big gap 
between the metropolitan regions in Central Europe 
(e.g. Prague, Bratislava, Budapest, Warsaw) and the 
rural regions especially in the South-East. Although 
the deviation decreased before 2008, the process of 
convergence was much slower on the regional level 
than between the whole states. Furthermore, the 
economic crisis has reversed the process since 2008, 
which is expressed by growing coefficients of 
variation both for the EU13 and for the whole EU. 
These numbers clearly reveal that the problem of 
regional disparities mainly effects the new member 
states, while inequalities in the EU15 remained on a 
much lower level over the whole period. 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Figure 2. Change of economic disparities in the 
EU28 (differentiated for “old” and “new” member 
states) on the regional level 2000-2011 
To put it in a nutshell, the comparison of 
national and regional results confirm the initial 
assumption that economic convergence in the EU is a 
success story with regard to the reduction of 
development gaps between the whole countries, but 
not on a regional scale. Additionally, the ongoing 
crisis since 2008 has stopped or even reversed the 
trend towards spatial equality and therefore 
aggravated the problem of diverging economic 
development. For a better understanding of these 
processes it seems helpful to investigate regional 
convergence within the countries. For that purpose 
figure 3 and table 1 show the change of coefficients 
of variation referring to regional GDP per capita 
separately for the EU15 and the EU13 countries (with 
the exception of Luxemburg, Malta and Cyprus, 
which consist of less than 5 Nuts-3 regions) between 
2000 and 2011. 
The results indicate that the changes of regional 
disparities within most of the old member states were 
rather moderate between 2000 and 2011. Only 
Finland faced a clear constant trend towards 
convergence (-2,2%), while only the Netherlands 
(+2,4%) and Ireland (+1,5%) were noticeably 
confronted by a widening gap between rich and poor 
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regions. Contrary to most of the accession countries 
(see figure 4), the poorest countries of the EU 15 
(Greece, Portugal, Spain) were not affected by 
increasing disparities over the whole period. Some 
countries, however, faced an unsteady development: 
In Greece, France, Ireland and the UK the period 
between 2000 and 2004 was characterized by strong 
regional convergence, which then changed to a 
process of growing disparities.  
Table 1. Average annual change of economic 
disparities within the “old” member states (EU15) 
2000 - 2011 in 3 sub-periods 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
In Denmark, Ireland and Sweden the global 
economic crisis strongly enhanced spatial inequalities 
after 2008, while in Belgium, Austria, Portugal and 
Finland it rather reduced the economic gap between 
regions. In spite of these singular and short-term 
exceptions, the distribution of economic performance 
remains rather balanced in the EU15 countries 
(+0,1%), with a slight trend towards growing 




Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Figure 3. Change of economic disparities within the 
“old” member states of the EU 2000 - 2011 
The results shown in figure 4 and in table 2 
present a totally different picture for the new member 
states in CEE. All countries faced growing regional 
disparities between 2000 and 2008 with very strong 
increases in Bulgaria, Lithuania, Czech Republic, 
Romania and Slovenia. A possible explanation for 
this striking trend can be found in the increasing 
competitive pressure, which forces both economic 
actors and governments to make use of 
agglomeration economies and to concentrate their 
activities on the few competitive economic centers.  
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Figure 4. Change of economic disparities within the 
“new” member states of the EU 2000 - 2011 
A substantial argument for increasing 
inequalities in the EU during 1990ies is prepared by 
Gianetti (2002), who attributes the diverging 
development of economically advanced and 
traditional regions to growing economic integration, 
which she expects to foster international knowledge 







regions 00-04 04-08 08-11 
EU15  -1,2% +0,7% +1,0% +0,1%  
AT -1,1% -0,6% -1,6% -1,0% 36 
BE +0,1% -1,1% -0,9% -0,6% 45 
DE -0,3% -0,7% +0,9% -0,1% 412 
DK +0,2% +0,1% +3,6% +1,1% 12 
EL -6,6% +4,8% +0,8% -0,6% 51 
ES -2,7% -1,5% +1,8% -1,1% 60 
FI -1,5% -4,1% -0,6% -2,2% 20 
FR -1,3% +2,6% +1,0% +0,7% 101 
IE -2,3% +1,5% +6,9% +1,5% 8 
IT -1,1% +0,6% +0,5% -0,1% 111 
NL +2,9% +3,5% +0,3% +2,4% 41 
PT +0,4% +0,1% -1,8% -0,3% 31 
SE -2,0% +0,9% +2,9% +0,4% 22 
UK -1,7% +3,9% +0,7% +1,0% 140 
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within the countries. In a similar way, Monfort and 
Nicolini (2000) argue that economic integration and 
liberalization of markets enhances spatial divergence 
within countries. Investigating the effects of 
interregional and international transaction costs on 
convergence, they conclude that a reduction of 
transaction costs tends to favor the spatial clustering 
of economic activities: “In this perspective, 
movements towards integration and international 
trade liberalization could be considered as factors 
possibly favoring the emergence of regional 
economic agglomeration inside countries.” (p. 304) 
Table 2. Average annual change of economic 
disparities within the “new” member states 2000 - 
2011 in 3 sub-periods 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
 
Surprisingly, this argumentation cannot applied 
to explain to the situation in most of the accession 
countries of the year 2004, where the speed of 
divergence rather slowed down after formal 
accession. Only Poland and Hungary had a slight 
acceleration of divergence after their accession in 
2004, starting from a comparatively low increase of 
disparities between 2000 and 2004. The comparison 
with the development in the EU15 countries reveals 
that the change of disparities after the EU-integration 
does not significantly deviate anymore from the 
values of the old-established EU-members in the 
same period. The rapid increase of regional 
disparities between 2004 and 2008 in Bulgaria and 
Romania suggests that divergence tends to speed up 
during the accession process the just before the 
factual EU-integration.  
The total reversal of this trend happened after 
the year 2008, when decelerated growth retarded the 
increase of regional disparities or even reduced them 
in countries like Latvia, Lithuania, Czech Republic 
and Slovenia. From the present state of available data 
it is not possible to predict whether this trend has 
continued until today and how it will proceed in 
future. The results, however, suggest that accelerating 
growth in the CEE countries would probably bring 
the problem of growing disparities back on stage. 
 
3. The relation between national 
growth and intranational 
disparities 
The results presented in the previous section 
clearly indicate that the catching-up process of the 
new member states of the EU is accompanied by 
growing regional divergence between booming urban 
centres and lagging rural areas, while spatial 
disparities in most of the well-established states in 
Western and Central Europe largely remained 
unchanged or even decreased. Furthermore, the 
sudden slump of economic growth in 2009 and the 
decelerated development in the following years, were 
associated with a slowdown of divergence in most of 
the new member states. These findings might lead to 
the hypothesis that the speed of total economic 
growth is empirically connected with the change of 
disparities within a country. 
This assumption is tested by a simple correlation 
analysis, which opposes the average annual GDP 
growth rates of the member states to the average 
annual change of disparities within the member states 
from 2000 to 2011. In spite of the methodological 
problems mentioned in section 2, regional disparities 
are measured both by the standard deviation and by 
the coefficient of variation of GDP per capita of 
NUTS-3-regions within the countries. First, the 
relation between total national growth and the change 
of regional disparities in the member states of the 







regions 00-04 04-08 08-11 
EU accession in 2004 
mean  +2,8% +1,2% -0,7% +1,2%  
CZ +3,9% +2,5% -1,9% +1,8% 14 
EE +5,5% -1,6% +0,7% +1,6% 5 
HU +1,0% +3,0% +1,3% +1,8% 20 
LT +5,1% +1,9% -2,2% +1,9% 10 
LV +1,5% +0,4% -7,9% -1,6% 6 
PL -0,1% +1,0% +1,7% +0,8% 66 
SI +4,2% +1,2% -0,8% +1,7% 12 
SK +1,3% +1,1% +3,5% +1,8% 8 
EU accession in 2007 
mean +0,9% +8,6% +1,3% +3,7%  
BG +2,6% +10,4% +1,9% +5,1% 28 
RO -0,7% +6,8% +0,7% +2,4% 42 
EU accession in 2013 
HR +2,9% -0,9% +2,1% +1,3% 21 
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Then, the correlation coefficients are shown in a 
methodological, spatial and temporal differentiation: 
Table 3 presents separate coefficients for 
 2 indicators of regional disparity 
- standard deviation 
- coefficient of variation 
 3 groups of countries (whole EU and 2 sub-
groups) 
- whole EU (EU28) 
- old member states (EU15) 
- accession countries of 2004, 2007, 2013 (EU13) 
 4 periods of time (whole period and 3 sub-
periods) 
- whole period (2000 - 2011) 
- before the enlargement of the EU (2000 - 2004) 
- before the outbreak of the global economic crisis 
(2004 - 2008) 
- during the crisis (2008 - 2011)    
The scatterplot in figure 5 provides a striking 
picture for the relation between the average annual 
national growth rate and the change of regional 
disparities measured by the standard deviation of 
GDP per capita in the Nuts-3-regions of a country. 
The obviously positive correlation in the scatterplot is 
confirmed by a highly significant (at the 0.01 level) 
correlation coefficient (+0,918), which is also 
significant for the two periods before the crisis, but 
not for the time after 2008 (see table 3). These results 
clearly indicate that the absolute deviations of 
regional GDP per capita from the national average 
rise with the national growth rates of a country, 
which can, however, be partly explained by a 
statistical size effect. In this approach constant 
regional differences from a growing mean of the 
sample (national GDP) would provide unchanged 
disparity levels, whereas in a relative consideration 
they would rather be interpreted as a sign of 
convergence (see section 2). 
  
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Figure 5. Correlation between total national growth 
and the change of regional disparities (measured by 
standard deviation of regional GDP per capita) 
 
 Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
Figure 6. Correlation between total national growth 
and the change of regional disparities (measured by 
coefficient of variation of regional GDP per capita) 
In order to eliminate the size effect caused by 
national growth and to consider relative deviations 
from national GDP levels, a second correlation 
analysis uses the coefficient of variation instead. The 
scatterplot in figure 6, which presents the relation 
between average annual growth of GDP and the 
average annual change of the coefficient of variation 
of regional (Nuts-3) GDP per capita values between 
2000 and 2011, provides a less impressive but still a 
distinct result: In spite of higher unexplained 
deviations the clearly positive correlation coefficient 
(+0,462) is still sufficiently significant at the 0.05 
level. Again, the first two sub-periods also provide 
positive (but only party significant) results, while 
there is no evidence for any relation between growth 
and changing spatial inequalities after 2008. 
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Nevertheless, the empirical findings for the whole 
sample (25 member states of the EU 28) confirm a 
statistical relation between national economic growth 
and increasing relative deviations of regional GDP 
per capita at least for the period before the economic 
crisis.  
Table 3. Correlation coefficients between total 
national growth and the average annual change of 
regional disparities on the NUTS-3-level in different 
periods and groups of EU member states 
 2000-2011 2000-2004 2004-2008 2008-2011 
Disparities measured by standard deviation 
EU28 +0,918** +0,789** +0,896** +0,333 
EU15 +0,281 -0,177 +0,146 +0,630* 
EU13 +0,740** +0,539 +0,807** +0,324 
Disparities measured by coefficient of variation 
EU28 +0,462* +0,425* +0,314 -0,023 
EU15 -0,209 -0,731* -0,335 -0,077 
EU13 +0,106 +0,120 +0,328 +0,199 
** significant at the 0.01 level * significant at the 0.05 level 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
The differentiated graphic presentation of the 
“old“ EU15-countries and the new member states 
(“EU13”) in both scatterplots, however, disclose two 
strongly diverging paths of development. While the 
EU15 countries show relatively low growth rates and 
(with some exceptions) stagnating or decreasing 
variation coefficients, most of the new member states 
in CEE face a catching-up process, which is 
characterized by fast economic growth and growing 
regional divergence. Whereas the figure 5 indicates 
that there is still some explaining power of national 
GDP growth rates, the scatterplot in figure 6 shows 
no pattern of correlation within the two groups of 
countries and therefore suggests that the change of 
regional economic disparities is less determined by 
national growth rates but rather by the type of 
country considered. Even though the correlation 
coefficients separately calculated for the two groups 
of member states have to be interpreted with caution 
due to the small sample (only countries with at least 5 
Nuts-3 regions were included in the analysis), they 
basically confirm the graphic impression: Referring 
to the change of relative disparities (as measured by 
the coefficient of variation) there is no statistical 
evidence of a significant relation between national 
growth and the change of disparities within the two 
country groups (see table 3).  
Although the coefficients for the new member 
states (“EU13”) show positive values for all periods, 
the deviation of different national development paths 
seems to be too big to provide significant results. The 
totally different ways of convergence in Bulgaria and 
Latvia, where similar annual growth rates (+7%) 
were connected with exploding disparities in the first 
case and with spatial equalization in the other, or the 
special situation of Poland, where prosperous 
economic development did not seriously increase 
regional inequalities, suggest that there must be other 
driving forces of spatial divergence. The analysis for 
the group of old member states (“EU15”) yet 
provides negative correlation coefficients. Even 
though the results are not significant for most 
periods, they slightly indicate that the faster growing 
countries of the EU15 tend to overcome their spatial 
inequalities more easily. The clearly positive 
correlation results for the EU13 when using the 
standard deviation for measuring regional disparities, 
confirm that the high growths rates in the new 
member states are strongly connected with increasing 
absolute deviations of regional GDP per capita from 
the national average. This result, however, can 
mainly be attributed to the statistical size effect in 
growing economies and not to a relative 
intensification of economic inequalities between the 
Nuts-3-regions of the countries. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The empirical investigation of changing spatial 
disparities in the European Union between 2000 and 
2011 indicates that economic convergence between 
the whole countries was much faster than on the 
Nuts-3 level until the year 2008 and almost came to a 
stop after the begin of the worldwide economic crisis. 
The gap between national and regional convergence 
can mainly be explained by growing regional 
inequalities within the majority of the new member 
states. Surprisingly, the diverging development of 
booming urban centers and lagging rural areas seems 
to be fastest during the final phase of the accession 
process and to slow down in most cases after the 
formal accession. This phenomenon indicates that the 
radical conversion of economic, social and political 
structures as a pre-condition for EU membership 
tends to increase regional disparities before EU-
integration, while the actual accession and the 
subsequent access to EU structural funds helps to 
reduce the economic gap between “rich” and “poor” 
regions.   
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The results presented in section 3 suggest that 
the apparent correlation between the speed of national 
economic growth and the intensity of regional 
divergence can mainly be traced back to the specific 
development paths of the EU15 on the one hand and 
the new member states on the other. In other words, it 
seems to be the particular situation in the CEE 
countries which is responsible for growing spatial 
inequalities and not the actual speed of national 
economic growth there. It can be confirmed that the 
catching-up process in the new member states goes 
hand in hand with increasing disparities between 
growing economic centers and lagging rural areas, 
but there is no clear evidence that the degree of 
divergence is higher in the fastest growing countries. 
The question remains, which of the specific 
conditions in the new member states are responsible 
for the strong disintegrative effect of economic 
development there. Based on various arguments from 
literature on polarized growth and on empirical 
evidence given in this paper there are three possible 
hypotheses, which might make a good case for 
explaining the phenomenon of increasing spatial 
inequalities in catching-up CEE countries:  
First, it can be argued that the intensity of 
agglomeration economies depends on the distribution 
of relevant production factors in space. Since the 
productivity of private investment tends to increase 
with capital endowment, infrastructure supply and 
labor skills in a region, big regional differences in 
relevant production conditions promote growing 
inequalities in GDP. In other words, agglomeration 
effects need a minimum amount of basic facilities 
and amenities to unfold and to amplify economic 
activities: “economic growth has a tendency to be 
associated with some sort of agglomeration and 
requires a minimum threshold of resources and 
activities in order to take place.” (Petrakos et al. 
2005, p.1838). Assuming that regional differences in 
basic location factors are more pronounced in less 
developed countries, the highly uneven distribution 
of relevant production factors between well-equipped 
urban centers and poorly resourced rural regions 
seems to be a possible reason for growing disparities 
in the new member states in CEE.  
Secondly, it is well plausible to claim that the 
emergence of positive trickling-down effects depends 
on the degree of integration of the economic system. 
Since the main handicap of the new member states 
can be attributed to the “adverse legacy effects of 
these earlier non-democratic governance systems”, 
which include “the use of outdated technologies, 
insufficient updated infrastructure, contaminated 
land, and institutional and governance systems with 
limited capacities and capabilities” (McCann 2015, 
p.19), they seem to be strongly disadvantaged in this 
dimension. Assuming that the quality of built 
facilities (e.g. cross-linked infrastructure networks), 
the interconnectedness of economic actors (often 
referred to as “social capital”, “embeddedness”,  
“institutional thickness” or “untraded 
interdependencies”: e.g. firm networks, co-
operations, linkages)  and the efficiency of the 
governance system clearly lag behind the well-
integrated countries in Northern and Western Europe, 
this line of argumentation suggests that growing 
disparities in the new member states are a 
consequence of less integrated economic systems, 
which impede the diffusion of positive spread effects 
from the booming growth poles to the lagging 
regions.  
Thirdly, the drastic conversion of economic, 
social and political structures in the new member 
states may account for a widening economic gap 
between “rich” and “poor” regions. Economic 
structural change, social and demographic 
transformation and the restructuring of the political 
system seem to benefit especially established centers, 
which are able to adopt new trends and innovations 
and to take economic advantage from them. On the 
contrary, these processes can be a serious threat for 
less developed regions, which often do not have the 
flexibility and the facilities to make use of changing 
conditions. The strong increase of regional disparities 
before the actual EU-integration (see section 2) might 
indicate that this effect mainly appears in the pre-
accession period, when the countries face the most 
radical changes to approach EU standards. 
The insight that it is not the speed of economic 
growth but the particular conditions in the CEE 
countries, which are responsible for fast spatial 
divergence in their catching-up process, leads to the 
conclusion that additional research is needed for 
assessing the driving forces of increasing spatial 
disparities thoroughly. In order to meet this 
challenge, the three hypotheses given above might 
give an indication to the causes of regional 
divergence within countries. For that purpose, it will 
be necessary to define suitable indicators for (a) the 
uneven distribution of endowment, (b) the integration 
of the economic system and (c) the conversion of 
economic, social and political structures and to test 
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